The Kathmandu Valley now shelters an estimated population of around four million when both permanent and floating residents are counted. This places it among the densest urban areas in the world. However, road infrastructure, the lifeline of the urban system, is grossly inadequate in Kathmandu Valley. Most world cities allocate fifteen to twenty five percent of urban land to roads. But only about five percent of land in the valley is used for roads, which is probably the lowest proportion among national capitals.Even Asian cities like Bangkok and Jakarta, both infamous for congestion, have managed to set aside around eight percent of their area for road space.
Meanwhile, private vehicle numbers in Nepal are growing at around seven percent annually, and a large share of this increase is concentrated in the valley. The pressure on the already narrow and limited road network is therefore intense.When population, income, and motorization continue to grow without any meaningful expansion of the road network, the transport system moves steadily toward collapse. Kathmandu is a clear case of this trend.
The relationship between motorization and congestion is rarely linear. A road network can absorb additional vehicle flow up to a point with only limited impact on travel time. As traffic approaches the physical limit of the network, even a slight rise in volume can trigger a dramatic fall in speeds. Engineers describe this as gridlock. Kathmandu is now approaching that tipping point. Average peak hour speeds on some sections of major corridors have already fallen below ten kilometres per hour. Once this threshold is reached, no level of traffic management or signalling reform can restore a reliable flow. The non-linear behaviour of road traffic creates extreme instability and unpredictability, undermining the basic functioning of the city.
Kathmandu’s worsening traffic congestion is moving toward a deep structural challenge. It threatens the city’s economy, public health, and quality of life. However, policymakers appear either unaware of the gravity of the situation or unwilling to confront the looming breakdown. Many proposed solutions are short lived measures. A flyover at a bottleneck or the replacement of small buses with larger ones may offer temporary relief, but the effectiveness of both depends entirely on the same constrained road network. A flyover’s impact may be limited to simply shifting the queue to the next intersection. Larger buses improve comfort but still crawl in congested traffic. Suggestions for trolleybuses, modern trams, or Bus Rapid Transit indeed sound progressive. However, in Kathmandu most corridors are too narrow to allow dedicated lanes for these modes without extensive widening, which is politically difficult, if not impossible. All road based modes, no matter how modern they appear, remain captive to the valley’s chronic shortage of road space.
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The critical challenge ahead is that purely road-based or bus-only solutions will soon fail to meet Kathmandu’s growing demand.Continuing with current approach will result in an unexpected crisis in urban mobility in near future. The only durable solution is a high capacity grade separated mass transit system. For Kathmandu, this means a metro rail network that can move large numbers of people efficiently, comfortably, and reliably without any interference from surface level congestion.
A major but often overlooked benefit of metro rail is its ability to guide compact and efficient urban development. This does not occur through coercive planning but through the natural response of markets. Homes, offices, shops, schools, and hospitals cluster around the metro stations because accessibility and mobility become the most valuable feature of a location. Markets achieve what planners often struggle to deliver. This creates a compact and transit oriented urban form, reduces sprawl, and protects the remaining agricultural land and green areas of the valley.
The metro-based urban restructuring also opens strong possibilities for value capture. By allowing higher building heights and higher floor area ratios around metro stations, and by taxing part of the resulting increase in land value, the government can recover a significant share of the metro investment. Global cities such as Hong Kong, Singapore, Tokyo, and Delhi finance a substantial portion of their urban rail investment through such mechanisms. Commercial development inside and above stations, including retail space, office towers, and hotels, also generates important non fare revenue that reduces the burden on public finances.
It is important to correct the common misconception that a metro must be financially feasible with recovery of full capital cost from fares. No metro system in the world achieves full capital cost recovery from ticket sales. Even the most efficient systems cover operating costs and part of the capital cost. This is rational and acceptable because the wider economic benefits far exceed fare revenue. These benefits include faster travel, higher productivity, cleaner air, a better city image, and rising land value.If built on Kathmandu’s busiest corridors and operated with an efficient business model, the metro can possibly recover its day to day operating costs without subsidy. The capital investment for the metro should be treated as essential public infrastructure, similar to roads and other public assets, and therefore justified on the basis of broader socio-economic goals rather than narrow financial metrics.
A practical metro network for Kathmandu is straightforward and aligned with the busiest travel corridors (see the map). A North-South line from Budhanilkantha through the city core to Lagankhel and Godavari, an East West line from Bhaktapur to Thankot through Koteshwor and Kalanki, and an elevated loop along the Ring Road together can serve a major share of existing travel demand. Feasibility studies by JICA, ADB, and KOICA have consistently highlighted these alignments. The technical and economic feasibility can now be well justified. What remains missing is political commitment and institutional readiness.
The most common objection to a metro is its cost, although the proposed three line system that combines elevated and underground segments is not beyond Nepal’s means. Elevated construction typically costs one third to one fourth of full underground construction per kilometre. The total cost for the three proposed lines could be around six billion US dollars, which might appear too high for Nepal. However, when this cost is spread over a full construction period of fifteen or twenty years, the annual investment comes well within Nepal’s reach. To begin with, the elevated line around the Ring Road can be built for around 1.5 billion US dollars. The cost of a metro, though seemingly high, is modest compared to the economic losses that would result from growing congestion. The Delhi Metro and other Indian systems offer clear lessons for Kathmandu, particularly the importance of strong political backing, institutional autonomy, steady execution, and systematic capacity building.
Policy makers now face a decisive moment. They can endorse the three line master plan and begin construction, or they can continue with piecemeal measures while waiting for a deeper mobility crisis. Metro rail in Kathmandu is not simply a desirable option. It is becoming a technical necessity for the long term functioning of the valley. Delay will also make future construction far more expensive. Once road space is saturated, new lines may need to be built entirely underground. Ad hoc construction of flyovers and underpasses can also create technical complications for metro construction works in future. Each year of delay reduces the metro’s ability to guide urban form and improve the quality of life for future generations. Metro rail is not a luxury. It is the only structural solution left. The time to act is now.
(The author is associated with the University of Nepal, X: @suryaracharya)
