At COP31 in Antalya, I have spent much of my time talking to people from multilateral development banks, international climate funds and institutions that mobilise capital for the green transition. These conversations are very different from the negotiating rooms we usually follow, and I have found them far more instructive.
One message has come through repeatedly: capital is available, but it wants to see a credible path to deployment, measurable outcomes and predictable returns.
Not all climate finance works in the same way. Adaptation and loss-and-damage funding will continue to depend on grants and highly concessional financing. But when the conversation turns to private capital, institutional investment and commercial finance, the questions change: What is the investment proposition, and how can risks and returns be made predictable? Even development banks and climate funds, whose mandates differ from those of commercial investors, must demonstrate that their money is being deployed effectively, projects are viable and results can be measured.
As I listened, I kept thinking about Nepal. We have enormous potential to become a regional clean-energy powerhouse. But I came away convinced that potential, climate vulnerability and ambitious targets alone do not attract capital. What does is a country capable of translating its ambitions into investable opportunities.
There is real energy at home to build on. The RSP government came to power with nearly a two-thirds of the seats in Parliament. Many of its members are young and enthusiastic, and since the Rasuwagadhi flood, our MPs have been speaking up on climate issues in national and international forums. Having five cabinet ministers from Nepal at COP31 is a significant indication of political interest and commitment. What I would love to see next is that energy translated into policy and action.
The numbers show why this matters. Nepal's National Adaptation Plan (NAP) 2021–2050 estimates that the country needs USD 47.4 billion for adaptation, much of which will go towards protecting communities, infrastructure and livelihoods rather than generating direct financial returns. I do not believe grants alone can meet this requirement. We should explore blended and catalytic financing structures that bring together grants, concessional finance, development capital and private investment. On mitigation, our ambition to generate 25,000 MW or more by 2035 is reflected in NDC 3.0, which puts the cost of mitigation through 2035 at USD 73.74 billion. About 85 percent of that amount (USD 62.92 billion) is conditional on international climate finance, technology transfer and capacity building. These are enormous numbers. But they also represent an enormous opportunity if we get the financing architecture right.
I approach this from the energy sector. I have worked in the sector, invested in hydropower and solar, and now spend time engaging with institutions that mobilise climate and development capital. From that vantage point, I have begun to see the opportunity differently. Climate justice is a cause we must continue to champion. But making a compelling case about our vulnerability is only half the task of raising climate finance. The other half is demonstrating that we can absorb capital, develop viable projects, protect investments and deliver results. I do not believe international institutions will take our investment ambitions more seriously than we do ourselves.
Here are the four things I keep coming back to.
1. Contracts that hold
This is the one I would put first.
One of the biggest deterrents for long-term investors is the fear that a government agency, whether a regulator, utility or ministry, might reinterpret an agreement, change the rules after capital has been committed, delay its own obligations or leave disputes unresolved for years.
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I say this having closely followed some of Nepal's early foreign investments in hydropower and its early investment funds, both of which have repeatedly faced scrutiny and uncertainty. These stories travel because international investors talk to one another. Their perception of Nepal is shaped not only by projects that succeed but also by how the State treats those who took the risk of being first.
What I hope to hear from the government is a clear commitment: existing contracts will be honoured; rule changes will apply prospectively rather than retrospectively; agreed commercial terms will not be casually reopened; credible dispute-resolution mechanisms will be built into major agreements; and legitimate disputes will be resolved within defined timelines.
This matters particularly for hydropower, transmission, solar and other projects that require large upfront investments and have lifespans spanning several decades. For a development bank or infrastructure fund, confidence in the contractual environment can determine whether a project is investable in the first place.
It is difficult for me to see how we can attract billions in green investment while those already here remain uncertain about whether their agreements will be respected.
2. A pipeline, not just a financing need
Nepal has no shortage of climate strategies, targets and policy documents. What I believe we lack is a sufficiently developed pipeline of projects that international institutions can actually finance.
There is a big difference between presenting a financing requirement and presenting an investment-ready project. A bankable project needs feasibility studies, reliable data, credible sponsors, land and environmental clearances, a sound financial model, a clear revenue stream, implementation capacity and an honest assessment of risks. I would love to see a dedicated green economy investment team working continuously with ministries, the private sector, development banks and climate funds to build such a pipeline.
This should extend well beyond hydropower. Transmission, solar, electric mobility, clean cooking, climate-resilient infrastructure, sustainable agriculture, forestry and carbon markets all have a role to play. Different projects, however, require different forms of capital. A commercially viable hydropower or solar project can attract equity, commercial debt and institutional investment. A flood-protection programme or climate-resilient settlement will need grants, concessional finance and public investment. Other projects can become viable through blended finance, in which guarantees or first-loss capital help bring private investors into the structure. The goal should be to match the right kind of capital with the right project.
Rather than knocking on the doors of every climate fund with a broad financing request, I would like us to approach them with a portfolio of well-prepared projects, with financing requirements and potential partners already identified. I want us to move from asking how much climate finance Nepal deserves to showing where that finance can go and what it can deliver.
3. Certainty over the long run
Investors do not make decisions based solely on what a project promises today. They want to know whether those returns can be sustained over the next 15, 20 or 30 years. This is particularly true in the energy sector.
Someone financing a hydropower project needs confidence in power purchase agreements, tariff structures, transmission access, evacuation arrangements, payment security and the regulatory framework. Solar investors need similar clarity on pricing, grid access and market arrangements. The same applies to emerging areas such as carbon credits, Article 6 mechanisms, electric mobility and green industry. Investors want to know the rules before committing capital, not discover them after the fact.
For me, this means:
· Long-term predictability in energy policy, power purchase agreements and tariffs.
· Transparent and consistent rules for private participation in transmission and electricity markets.
· Clear tax treatment and binding advance rulings for major investments.
· A credible regulatory framework for carbon markets and Article 6 transactions.
· Protection against arbitrary or retrospective changes to agreed commercial and regulatory terms.
Policy uncertainty comes at a financial cost. It increases the perceived risk of a project, raises the cost of capital and can make an otherwise viable investment unattractive. If we want to attract serious international funds, I believe the most valuable thing we can offer is not an incentive that may change with the next government, but a predictable framework within which investors can calculate their risks and returns.
4. Returns and exits that are boring
Attracting capital is only the beginning. The real test is whether it can be deployed efficiently, produce the expected outcomes and, where relevant, generate returns and allow investors to exit without unnecessary obstacles.
For an international investor, bringing money into Nepal is only half the decision. The other half is knowing that, after complying with Nepali law and paying applicable taxes, they can repatriate their returns: dividends, interest, loan principal, royalties, approved management and technical service fees, and proceeds from an eventual exit. This should be a predictable administrative process, not a discretionary exercise involving multiple offices and repeated approvals. Clear documentary requirements, no duplicate approvals, firm service standards aligned with statutory timelines and publicly reported average processing times would go a long way.
I have seen how complicated an investor's journey can become. First comes the bureaucratic hurdle of getting an investment through the system. Then, even after capital has been committed, investors can find themselves embroiled in prolonged legal disputes because the terms set out in an agreement are open to conflicting interpretations. What should be a straightforward commercial process turns into an extended exercise in bureaucracy and litigation. This is particularly damaging for green infrastructure, where confidence in long-term cash flows, debt servicing, dividends and exit options is essential.
Making capital deployment and repatriation administratively boring would be a real sign of investment maturity.
What Antalya reinforced for me
Nepal has an extraordinary opportunity. We have enormous hydropower potential, abundant renewable resources, a young population and an urgent need for climate-resilient infrastructure. We can also become a source of clean electricity for a region that will need far more energy as it expands its digital economy, electrifies transport and transitions towards cleaner industries.
But I do not believe any of this can happen at the scale we envision unless we change how the State works with capital: protecting investments, building a pipeline of bankable green projects, providing long-term policy and revenue certainty, and making capital deployment and returns predictable. These are not merely investment reforms. They are the foundations of Nepal's green economic transformation.
If there is one lesson I will take home from Antalya, it is that international institutions increasingly look for countries that can move beyond commitments and demonstrate their ability to translate them into credible investments and measurable outcomes. We need to learn to speak both languages: the language of climate justice and the language of investment. We should continue making the case for the finance we deserve as a climate-vulnerable country while creating the conditions in which development banks, climate funds and private investors can deploy capital with confidence.
The world may well be willing to finance Nepal's green transition. I want us to be ready to deliver it.
The author is a media executive, author and climate and clean energy advocate.