The globe-trotting Indian Prime Minister would ideally have limitless attention span. Narendra Modi could then personally shape India's foreign policy with each and every country on the planet. Much like Jawaharlal Nehru, the first prime minister of India, the 15th occupant of the Indian PMO has made foreign policy the central plank of his rule. Like Nehru, Modi also enjoys sweeping powers as the head of the government with a clear majority in the lower house. But also like Nehru Modi is just another human being with a limited attention span. He thus has no option but to delegate some of his responsibilities.Modi certainly has the right ideas. He rightly believes that for India to stake a claim on global leadership—with membership of the United Nations Security Council India's ultimate dream—it first has to demonstrate clear leadership in its near abroad. It was with this realization that Modi invited all seven SAARC heads of state (of course, bar India's) to attend his swearing-in ceremony as prime minister on May 26th, 2014. The businessman from Gujarat thus seemed interested in doing serious business with other SAARC states.
But slowly Modi had his hands full dealing with the likes of Pakistan (repeatedly held responsible for terrorist attacks in India, most recently in Pathankot in Punjab) and China (with which India has multiple border disputes and whose growing influence India is looking to counter in the neighborhood). So while he may already have visited 37 countries across five continents, most of the time Modi devotes to India's foreign policy is consumed by these two countries; or by other economically and strategically important bilateral partners like the US and Russia.
Small fries
In case of its smaller neighbors like Nepal and Sri Lanka, as much as Modi would like to handle them all by himself, he has to rely on his close advisers and bureaucrats to do the right thing after painting broad outlines of his desired outcomes. Nepal has long been a victim of such delegation of Indian political leadership.
In this time-honored tradition, Indian policy on Nepal continues to be shaped by the likes of the Indian prime minister's national security adviser, the handlers of Nepal desk in the South Block and New Delhi-based think tanks and analysts. Like his predecessors Prime Minister Modi also appears to hear what these people want him to hear.
What they have been telling him about Nepal of late isn't hard to guess. Modi was told that China was check-mating India in its own backyard; that BJP's pet agenda of Hindutwa and the party's desire to see a Hindu state in Nepal was being subverted by cunning missionaries from Europe and America; that if the Madheshi parties were not accommodated in the new constitution, there could be a full-blown secessionist movement in Tarai-Madhesh; and that India, for all these reasons, must forcefully intervene to safeguard its interests in Nepal.
But whatever he was told the ultimate decision rested with the prime minister. If Modi, as he had repeatedly vouched, was committed to improving ties with Nepal, the onus was on him to try to better understand ground realities in Nepal, before deciding to impose a crippling trade embargo on its supposedly closest friend. Modi surely knows that one sovereign country should not meddle, without a direct threat to its interests, in the affairs of another sovereign country. Moreover, with nearly the whole political establishment in Nepal beholden to India, Modi could have easily employed less obtrusive means to express his displeasure with Nepal's constitutional process. There was no need to inflict such hardship on Nepali people and in the process whip up the latent anti-India sentiments.
It's said that India was afraid of a secessionist movement at its doorstep—and about its likely fallout in the restive Indian North-East and Kashmir. But this is hard to buy since the secessionist movement in Tarai-Madhesh has limited support, even among native Madheshis. And without some help from India, it would be impossible for such a movement to flourish just across the border in Nepal. In fact, it could be argued that the Indian blockade has actually accentuated the divides between Pahadis and Madheshis in Nepal and emboldened such secessionist forces.
Old stew, again
But then it could be an Indian policy to cultivate these dormant secessionists and extremists—as it once did with Nepali Maoists. If so, the Modi government, whatever its claims, is no different to the previous Manmohan Singh government which was happy to delegate all things Nepal to his bureaucrats and spooks. These lower-level functionaries were given to believe they had carte blanche to do as they pleased in Nepal.
The Modi government—and especially the Minister for External Affairs, Sushma Swaraj—likes to make much of the fact that the previous two Indian National Congress-led governments completely ignored Nepal. (Swaraj recently reminded the Indian parliament that Manmohan Singh had not bothered to visit Nepal once during his 10 years as prime minster.) But it seems Narendra Modi, like Singh, also views Nepal through the same-old Nehruvian lens whereby Nepal is seen as falling under the Indian 'sphere of influence', whereby any effort of Nepal to diversify its relations with the rest of the world is frowned upon.
I am not an idealist. Like the Indian establishment, I too believe Nepal-India policy will continue to be dictated to a large extent by geography. Nothing is going to change the fact that Nepal is virtually India-locked: the whole of Nepal lies firmly within Indian territories with only its northern border abutting China's Tibet. But as Robert Kaplan so persuasively argues in The Revenge of Geography, although geography determines long term balance of power, foreign policy in the here and now is largely the function of human agency. If Prime Minister Modi can help a small neighbor like Nepal overcome its geographical constraints, there will be no better proof of Indian leadership.
biswasbaral@gmail.com
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