KATHMANDU, July 19: A government investigation into the Saurya Airlines crash has concluded that the accident was caused by a deep stall during take-off, triggered by an abnormally rapid pitch rate at a lower-than-optimal rotation speed. In addition, a report prepared by the probe team has discovered that the airline operator attempted to tamper with evidence to hide the operational failures that contributed to the crash.
The findings of the final report presented by a probe committee to the Ministry of Culture, Tourism and Civil Aviation (MoCTCA) on Friday exposed a cascade of operational failures, procedural violations, and regulatory negligence, revealing how deeply flawed practices went unchecked — ultimately leading to the tragedy.
The probe commission led by former director general of CAAN, Ratish Chandra Lal Suman, has reported that the aircraft entered a deep stall after the pilot commanded an excessively fast pitch rate during take-off. According to the report, the pitch rate reached as high as 8.6 degrees per second, significantly above the safe standard, while the aircraft was still below the appropriate rotation speed. The combination of these factors critically impaired lift generation, resulting in a loss of control.
According to Minister for Culture, Tourism and Civil Aviation Badri Prasad Pandey, the ministry is analyzing the report submitted on Friday and will soon announce action against the airline operator and other concerned authorities.
“I have taken a quick look at the report,” Minister Pandey told Republica, “The ministry will soon hold a press conference to announce actions against the regulatory body as well as the airline.”
Preliminary probe report cites protocol failures by CAAN, airli...
The probe report outlined four major contributing factors that collectively set the stage for the crash including incorrect V-speeds due to faulty speedcard, failure to act on prior high-pitch events, negligence in ferry flight planning and execution, and unsafe and rushed cargo handling.
Evidence tampering, fire hazards and rescue failures
According to the report, the flight crew calculated takeoff speeds based on an erroneous speedcard interpolated for a takeoff weight of 18,500 kg. However, the actual aircraft weight was 18,137 kg. Investigators found that the speedcard had contained incorrect values since its inception, yet it had never been reviewed, approved, or accepted by the regulator. As a result, incorrect V1 and VR speeds were used — contributing to improper aircraft handling during liftoff.
As per the report, the aircraft was also carrying dangerous goods and flammable materials that intensified the post-crash fire. These items were neither declared nor safely stored, exacerbating the situation and obstructing rescue efforts. At Tribhuvan International Airport, emergency response was delayed due to poor access, one critical gate was blocked by stored construction materials, and a lack of preparedness and drills for such emergencies.
The report further criticized airport authorities for removing and transporting baggage from the crash site to the airline’s Sinamangal office on the same day — an act investigators labeled as evidence tampering.
“It shows negligence of airport authority to effectively perform responsibilities in the event of an aircraft accident.”
Investigators discovered a history of abnormal pitch rates during take-off in the airline’s flight records. Despite these repeated incidents, the operator never identified the issue, nor implemented corrective measures. The lack of a functional Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) or Flight Data Analysis (FDA) program meant such anomalies went unflagged.
The report highlighted gross negligence in how the ferry flight — meant to transport the aircraft without passengers — was prepared and conducted. There was no clear or consistent definition of what constitutes a ferry flight within the airline's manuals. Individuals unrelated to the flight were allowed onboard, violating aviation norms.
The investigation also found severe lapses in how baggage and cargo were handled. Items were not weighed, distributed, or secured in accordance with the operational and ground handling manuals. There was no use of nets, tie-downs, or straps. The load-trim sheet failed to reflect the aircraft’s true center of gravity. Investigators described the entire loading process as rushed, reckless, and non-compliant.
Regulatory and technical oversight failures
The Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal (CAAN) came under harsh scrutiny for failing to exercise meaningful oversight. Inspectors did not detect the airline's recurring non-compliances during routine checks. CAAN also lacked proper procedures for approving Reduced Take-Off Weight (RTOW) operations and failed to verify the airworthiness of the flight data systems.
Moreover, key flight control parameters, such as control column, rudder pedals, flap handle, and brake inputs, were not recorded by the aircraft’s Flight Data Recorder (FDR). This flaw existed in both aircraft in the fleet, yet neither the airline nor CAAN was aware of it.