On January 29th, the Tibetan religious leader Kyabje Jonang Gyaltsab Rinpoche arrived in Kathmandu. Two Nepali political figures, Jhalanath Khanal and Ram Bahadur Thapa, framed this visit as a potential threat to China, articulating the traditional perception of risk in Nepal-China relations.
In another separate incident, the nationality of climate activist Tashi Lazhom was called into question upon her nomination to a ministerial position in the Nepali cabinet. Originally from Humla, she was erroneously accused of being a Tibetan refugee, and her potential appointment was subsequently framed as a perceived threat to China.
Additionally, a congratulatory message from the Dalai Lama to the caretaker Prime Minister Sushila Karki also elicited suspicion in Nepal-China relations. Furthermore, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) had become another point of contention. Politician Bhim Rawal and analyst Yubaraj Sangraula expressed the MCC initiative as an American strategic maneuver that could challenge China’s interests.
Ironically, the aforementioned cases and the corresponding construction of a threat narrative in Nepal-China relations obscure the socio-cultural realities of both countries. Several Nepali ethnic groups not only share a border but also share a livelihood with the Tibet Autonomous Region. Especially regions such as Dolpo and Mustang exhibit significant cultural and religious affinities with Tibet.
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Similarly, Tashi Lazhom originates from the Humla district, an area whose ethnic communities share historical, cultural, and religious ties with Tibetan traditions. Her Humla lineage became a basis for suspicion regarding her ministerial appointment. In response, the Gen Z council had to issue a public statement characterizing the suspicion as communal harm. Here, the old-school threat narrative ultimately undermined Tashi’s, who is a Nepali citizen, rights to participate fully in governance and public office.
At the same time, Nepal is constitutionally secular and guarantees religious freedom to its citizens. Several ethnic communities in Nepal and the Tibet Autonomous Region practice the same religious traditions and share common spiritual lineages.
In this context, the invitation of Tibetan Rinpoches to Nepal is not only a geopolitical agenda. It also reflects the religious and spiritual needs of Nepali citizens. The Dolpo community, for instance, defended Rinpoche’s visit as a historical and spiritual relationship between the community and the Jonang Buddhist tradition. Interpreting these religious engagements unilaterally as security threats overlooks Nepal’s pluralistic social fabric and risks questioning Nepali citizens’ religious rights for geopolitical agendas.
In addition to cultural and religious sensitivities, the discourse surrounding the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) illustrates how politicians and commentators construct threat narratives against China. Within Nepal’s political and public spheres, the MCC agreement was frequently framed as anti-Chinese and antagonistic to Chinese interests. They characterized the initiative as an attempt by the United States to leverage Nepali soil against China, reinforcing the old-school threat narrative in Nepal-China relations.
However, this old-school framing overlooks the potential mutually beneficial economic outcomes associated with cross-border infrastructure investment. For instance, the planned transmission line project, which would enable Nepal to export surplus hydroelectricity to neighboring Indian states such as Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, could stimulate investment in Nepal’s hydropower sector. At the same time, it would support the expansion of domestic demand for electric appliances and electric vehicles (EVs) across Nepal and the Indian states.
Nepal’s electric vehicle market is a clear example of how economic and technological developments go beyond threat narratives. In the 2024/25 fiscal year, Nepal imported approximately 13,483 four-wheeled EVs, of which about 76 percent (10,194 units) originated from China, reflecting the dominant role of Chinese manufacturers in the country’s EV sector. Improved cross-border energy infrastructure under initiatives such as the MCC could facilitate regional electricity trade and indirectly support the expansion of EV markets, creating opportunities that may benefit Nepal, India, and Chinese manufacturers alike.
Viewed through this lens, initiatives like MCC and regional energy trade do not inherently threaten Nepal’s relations with China. Rather, in the future, they may advance Nepal’s developmental goals and contribute positively to Nepal-China relations if communicated beyond securitized threat narratives.
In summary, the traditional threat-focused narrative in Nepal-China relations overlooks contemporary social, cultural, and economic realities. It not only diminishes the recognition of Nepali ethnic identities but also attempts to limit opportunities for trilateral economic cooperation. Nepal should not overlook the fact that a similar threat perception toward the Madhesi community—often framed through their ethnic and cultural ties with India—has historically contributed to distrust and resentment toward Nepalis living in the southern plains.
Therefore, Nepal needs a recalibrated narrative in its relations with China. It should firmly reaffirm its commitment to the One-China policy while recognizing the longstanding historical, cultural, and religious linkages between certain Nepali communities and the Tibet Autonomous Region. Such a framework should underscore that safeguarding the cultural and religious rights of these communities is fully compatible with Nepal’s sovereignty and does not constitute, nor enable, any security threat to China. Lastly, Nepal should emphasize that its constructive external engagement can also generate meaningful economic benefits through trade, investment, connectivity, and tourism.
The author is a freelance researcher. He can be reached at ashis_adhikary@hotmail.com.
